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ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE MODELS
Abstract
This paper studies whether relaxing the noise trader assumption in
Kyle (1985) results in an equilibrium solution which is equivalent to
the original solution in the following sense: market depth, the
expected total trading volume and the expected price level have the same
equilibrium values as in the original model. Conditions are derived for
which the "hedging" model of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) is shown to
be equivalent, both when the number of uninformed traders is finite as
well as when it goes to infinity in a particular way. The equilibrium
solution of a version of Glosten (1989) is only partially equivalent,
but any deviation in the equilibrium values from those in Kyle (1985) is
bounded
.

ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE MODELS
In his remarks introducing a market micro-structure symposium,
Chester Spatt (1991) attested to the need for assessing "the robustness
of microstructure analyses," in particular by considering the "trading
incentives of 'liquidity' traders." While there have been several
recent advances in this direction, most of these papers have not
specifically addressed the question of robustness. A notable exception
is Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) who extend the framework of Kyle
(1985) by modeling the noise traders as risk-averse investors who trade
to "hedge" their endowment of shares of the risky asset. The focus of
their paper is on showing that several comparative static results in
Kyle (1985) are upset by their generalization and they conclude by
stating that "postulating the existence of noise traders with exogenous
demands therefore, is not solely a convenient modeling device ... it
is an assumption whose relaxation alters many of the basic results."
This paper takes a different, though complementary, tack. Instead
of considering comparative static results, it looks at the equilibrium
solution of the Kyle (1985) model 1 and asks the following question.
Consider an alternative equilibrium solution that results when the noise
trader assumption is relaxed. When are these two solutions equivalent
in the following sense: the equilibrium values of market depth, the
expected total trading volumes and the expected price levels are exactly
the same? 2 Notice that "equivalence" is defined with respect to
aggregate market variables, 3 which a casual market observer might
reasonably be expected to know or find out. 4 If there are two markets
which are equivalent in the above sense, such an observer should, on
average, be indifferent as to which market he would like to trade in.
In other words, the apparently "separate" models are really describing
the same underlying market.
Specifically, in this paper I compare the equilibrium solution in
Kyle (1985) with those in two alternative representations of uninformed
trading: the hedging model of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) and a
version of Glosten (1989). The common element in all three models is
that price determination occurs through the batch market mechanism. The
former model can be viewed as a model of uninformed traders (i.e., there
is a distinct group of investors whose trading motives are unrelated to
information) whereas the latter is a model of uninformed trading, in
that the same investor trades for both risk-sharing and information
reasons. It turns out that this distinction is crucial. In particular,
it is shown that, while equivalence exists between Kyle (1985) and the
hedging model, the expected price level is strictly lower in Glosten
(1989) relative to its equilibrium value in Kyle (1985), rulinq out full
equivalence between the latter two models. The reason for this is
explained below.
In Glosten (1989) there is a single risk-averse investor who
trades for both risk-sharing as well as for informational reasons. Let
1/r denote the market depth. Then the investor's trades are, in
equilibrium, inversely proportional to the sum of r plus a risk-premium,
unlike the other two models where an individual risk-neutral informed
trader's equilibrium trades are proportional to the market depth only.
This implies that, to sustain the same volume of trading as in the other
two models, market depth must be higher or r lower in Glosten (1989).
Conversely, to maintain the same market depth, the equilibrium total
trading volume must be lower. Hence, the expected price level (which is
a product of r and the expected total trading volume) must be lower as
well.
For the hedging model, equivalence is derived for two separate
cases. When the number of hedgers is finite, the hedgers' risk-aversion
parameter must have a specific value which depends upon the variances of
both the asset value and the hedgers' endowments as well as the amount
of information in the market. Of course, the degree of risk-aversion is
an exogenous parameter and so there is nothing to ensure that this value
will in fact be attained. Thus, equivalence is also derived for a limit
economy where the equivalence condition is independent of the value of
the risk-aversion parameter. Let k be the number of uninformed
investors each with a random endowment w of shares of a risky asset and
let Z
H
be the variance of this endowment. Then, equivalence holds if k
tends to infinity in such a way that the total amount of noise kZ
H
tends
to a finite number (which implicitly requires that S
H
-» as k -» <») .
This result formalizes the notion that the equilibrium outcome of Kyle
(1985) can be viewed as the limiting solution to a game with one or more
risk-neutral informed traders and a large number of risk-averse and
atomistic uninformed traders who trade for risk-sharing reasons alone.
For the Glosten (1989) model, although full equivalence is
impossible, partial equivalence exists since the equilibrium values of
either the market depth or the expected total trading volume can
separately (but not simultaneously) be equal to their corresponding
values in Kyle (1985). In addition, the differences in the equilibrium
values of the variables between the two models is bounded from above.
Finally, under a further restriction, the equilibrium market depth has
the same value in all three models and the (unconditional) expected
utility of Glosten's investor is equal to the (unconditional) expected
profits of a single informed trader in the other two models.
Overall, given this paper's particular approach to the robustness
question, Kyle's (1985) model turns out to be surprisingly robust with
respect to a relaxation of the noise trader assumption. 6 For the class
of uninformed trader models, it is possible to move in a continuous
fashion between Kyle (1985) and these models simply by changing the
number of uninformed traders while keeping the total noise in the market
fixed. For the class of uninformed trading models, the lack of full
equivalence can be traced to the additional dichotomy created due to the
lack of a group of risk-neutral purely informed traders in these models.
Even in this case, however, it is possible to show that the equilibrium
solutions cannot be arbitrarily far apart. Thus, while the importance
of examining different models which deviate from the noise trader
assumption remains, the researcher can also take comfort from observing
a deeper unity connecting the original paradigm of Kyle (1985) to some
of the successor models.
The two representations of uninformed trading studied in this
paper were chosen for their ease of comparability to the Kyle (1985)
model. Other valid models of uninformed trading exist as well. One of
the earliest attempts at modeling uninformed traders as strategic
players was in Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) who allow uninformed traders
to choose when to trade (although not how much). Similar approaches can
be found in Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) and Subrahmanyam (1991). Laffont
and Maskin (1990) study a model with a risk-neutral price-setting
insider and a continuum of risk-averse uninformed traders. They study
both separating and pooling equilibria and derive conditions such that
all investors would prefer the pooling equilibrium. In Bhattacharya and
Spiegel (1991) both the monopolist insider and the continuum of
uninformed traders are risk-averse. Prices are set through a Walrasian
auction mechanism and both linear and non-linear trading strategies are
derived.
An interesting approach to the uninformed traders issue is found
in two papers by Gorton and Pennacchi (1990, 1992). In their models,
all investors have endowments of a consumption and a capital good and
live for three periods. Some subset of uninformed investors must
consume early and so are forced to trade with informed traders.
However, uninformed traders may contract with financial intermediaries
or trade in index-linked securities to protect themselves from
exploitation by informed traders. The intermediaries protect uninformed
traders by splitting the cash flows into equity and (relatively)
riskless debt, with informed traders holding the former and uninformed
traders the latter. Index-linked securities have a lower return
variance relative to the underlying primitive securities and thus reduce
the expected trading losses of the uninformed traders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I lays out a
generalized version of Kyle (1985) and restates the results of Spiegel
and Subrahmanyam (1992). Section II shows the equivalence of these two
models for both the finite and the limit economy. Section III derives a
version of Glosten (1989) and compares its equilibrium solution to that
of Kyle (1985). Section IV concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
I. Uninformed Traders as Hedgers
In Section A, a generalized version of the model of Kyle (1985) is
described with multiple informed traders and imperfect information.
This is followed in Section B with a statement of the model of Spiegel
and Subrahmanyam (1992).
Ac The Noise Trading Model
Consider a market in which a single risky asset with an unknown
liquidation value v is traded. There is a group of m informed traders
each of whom receive, prior to trading, signals s 1 about the unknown
value v. The signals are of the form s 1 = v + e', i=l,...,m where the
error terms e 1 are independent of each other. In addition, there is a
group of uninformed noise traders who trade for liquidity reasons. The
uninformed traders' motives for trading are not modeled.
Each informed trade i=l,...,m submits a market order x' to a market
maker. The noise traders also collectively submit market orders worth u
to the same market maker for execution. The latter then fixes a single
price pn at which she will execute the total order flow yn = xn + u,
where x
n
is the combined market orders of the informed group in the
noise trader model. The market maker is assumed to be risk-neutral and
competitive. Conditional on observing yn , she earns zero expected
profits.
The random variables in the model are v, u and e 1 , i=l,...,m. All
these variables are normally distributed with zero mean and finite
variances Ey , 2 and 2 , respectively. Thus the m error terms are drawn
from an identical distribution. In addition, all informed investors
follow linear trading rules x' = A
n
s', i=l,...,m. This implies that the
market maker's pricing rule is also linear: P( vn ) = rnvn' wnere rn =
Cov(v,y
n
)/Var(y ) is the now-familiar market depth parameter.
Define t = ZW/(S +E„) and note that < t < 1. tisa measure ofv * v e'
the unconditional precision of s', i=l,...,m. For example, if t = 1 then
s
1 is a perfect signal. Further, define Q = [l+t(m-l)] where 1/Q is a
measure of the posterior valuation of v conditional on observing the
m-vector of signals (s 1 ,...,sm ). Finally, let s denote the sum of all the
m
signals, i.e., s = ^s 1 . Lemma 1 describes the equilibrium solution
for the noise trader model and Lemma 2 describes its properties. (In
Lemma 2, price informativeness PI
n
= Sy - Var(v|pn ).)
Lemma 1: In the noise trader model, each informed trader i=l,...,m trades
A.
x' A
n
s' and the price is pn = r^, where A^ = ^-(^1+Q) and
r m
yStr;
(i*q)^b;
Lemma 2% The noise trader model is characterized by the following
properties %
1. Market depth 1/r is proportional to the ratio of noise to
information in the market.
mt £
2 o Price informativeness PI n = and is independent of the
amount of noise.
3. Total (unconditional) expected profits of the informed
JttfcEJL
Zn = -*— and is proportional to the standard deviations
of noise and asset value and the square root of the total
amount of information mt in the market.
4. Total (conditional) expected profits of the informed
t as aC. =
rnQ(i+Q) a .
Next, the basic model is extended to allow for rational behavior
by uninformed traders.
B. The Model With Uninformed Traders as Rational Hedgers
There are k risk-averse uninformed traders ("hedgers") who trade
for purely risk-sharing reasons. The development of the model here
follows Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). Each hedger j has random
endowment w J , which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variance 2
H
. w J
,
j=l,...,k are independent of each other and all
other random variables in the model. All hedgers have negative
exponential utility functions with risk-aversion parameter R^.
Suppose that all hedgers submit market orders u-' to the market
maker and follow linear trading rules of the form u J = Dw J
, j = l,...,k.
Let the total uninformed trades be uh = Tu^. If tr is the profit of
the j-th hedger, then u J is chosen to maximize her utility or certainty-
equivalent profits Vhj = E(*h|w 3 ) - -=* var («hl w:) )• Tne informed traders
maximization problem remains the same as before, since each w J is
independent of v. 7
Market depth is now positively related to the magnitude of the
"hedge factor" D (since this increases the variance of the total order
flow) and to the risk aversion parameter R^. Further, the equilibrium
D < since the marginal utility of the hedgers from a purchase (sale)
is negative if endowments are positive (negative).
Let xh and IV be the total informed trading volume and the market
depth parameter in the hedger model. Lemma 3 (which is identical to
Proposition 1 in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992)) describes the
equilibrium. Equilibrium exists if the amount of risk-aversion and
noise in the market exceeds the amount of information available.
Lemma 4 is a comparison of the equilibrium properties of the current
model with that of Kyle (1985). The comparison is expressed by relating
the equilibrium values of the relevant variables in these two models
(part 2 of the lemma is contained in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992)).
|d| refers to the absolute value of D.
Lemma 3: An equilibrium to the hedger model exists if Rh satisfies:
» = R
te
(2-t)
v
1TE72; - 2^fit > 0. (!)
In equilibrium,, each hedger j=l,~,k trades u J - DwJ , where D < 0, market
depth is l/r
h ands
r>P = - V*
5
—^ ( 2)
p. -»<1+Q)k (3)
RhHr [(2-t)lc(l*<3)-mt] v '
10
Each informed trader i=l,...,m trades x 1 = A^s' , where Ab = -. The
price is ph = rhyh/ where yh = x„ + uh .
Lemma 4: The hedger model is characterized by the following properties
?
1. Market depth
-J- *—*
.
2. Price informativeness PIh = PI_.n n
3
.
Unconditional expected profits of the informed group
i ,i ipiv^
Vs"
r
4. Conditional expected profits of the informed group Ch = CQ =£ ,
Comparing Lemmas 2 and 4, it is apparent that the two models of
uninformed trading differ essentially along two dimensions: the
magnitude of the hedge factor D and the amount of noise which is 2 in
one case and kZ
H
in the other. These two factors, in turn, determine
the differences in equilibrium market depth, informed profits and
trading volumes.
II. The Equivalence of the Two Models
In this section, it is shown that there exist conditions under
which the equilibrium solutions of the two models are equivalent.
I will first define what is meant by "equivalence of the two models."
Definition 1: The two models of uninformed trading described in
Section I will be considered equivalent if the equilibrium values of the
following variables are equal: market depth, the expected total trading
volumes and the expected price levels.
Even if Definition 1 is satisfied, the two models share the same
equilibrium solution "on average" only since it is the expected and not
11
the actual total trading volumes (and, by implication, the actual
prices) which are being equated. There is no sensible way that the
actual total trading volumes can be equated since this would require the
actual uninformed trading volumes to be equated.
Corollary 1: If the conditions in Definition 1 are met, then the
following variables are also equal in the two models: the actual and
expected informed trading volumes and profits and the expected
uninformed trading volumes .
Thus, Corollary 1 implies that an implication of equivalence is
that the equilibria in the two models would be characterized in
identical fashion (refer to Lemmas 2 and 4). It is easy to show that
price informativeness PI is directly proportional to the square of the
expected price level. Thus PI h = PI n implies that the expected price
levels are also equal. The conditions under which the equilibrium
values of the other two variables named in Definition 1 would be equated
are discussed next.
A« Equivalence in a Finite Economy
Suppose that the amount of noise in the two economies are pegged
at the same level, i.e., 2 = kJE . Then, from the discussion following
Lemma 4, if D = -1 (uninformed traders hedge perfectly), the two models
are equivalent in the sense of Definition 1. The condition for which
D = -1 is satisfied requires that the risk-aversion parameter R^ satisfy
a particular value given in Proposition 1. It can be shown that, at
this value, R^ is directly proportional to the equilibrium market depth.
12
Proposition It Suppose that E = kS . Then if R^ = ±i±jSJ3L± t the two
>itE^E;
models of uninformed trading are equivalent.
Given the value of R^ specified in Proposition 1, D = -1 and each
uninformed trader hedges all of his endowment in equilibrium.
k
Uninformed traders as a group trade (the negative of) wh = Y^w^, Thus,
the equilibrium behavior of the hedgers mimic that of the noise traders.
The additional assumption k2
w
= Z
u
amounts to a scaling of these
variances ensuring that the total amount of noise in the two models is
the same.
In an economy with a finite number of hedgers, the risk aversion
parameter R^ is required to have a specific value. Since Rh is
exogenous to the model, a more natural outcome is one where the
equivalence holds for any value of R^. Such an outcome is described in
the next sub-section.
B. Equivalence in a Limit Economy
In the limit, as the number of hedgers k goes to infinity, D goes
to -1. However, without further restrictions on the parameters,
equilibrium fails to exist in the limit as the market becomes infinitely
deep (Th -» 0). To ensure the existence of an equilibrium, I make the
following assumption:
Assumption 1: As k -» oo, k£ * 2 > (Z finite)
For Assumption 1 to hold, it must be true that as the number of
hedgers k increases, the variance of each hedger's endowment becomes
smaller (Sy -» 0) in such a way that the total amount of noise k£H
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remains a constant. The effect of this assumption is to assure that, in
the limit economy, each uninformed trader is atomistic and the group of
uninformed traders behaves as a continuum.
Proposition 2: Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If Z - Su , then the two
models of uninformed trading described in Section I are equivalent.
The additional assumption Z = S is analogous to the assumption
kE
w
= E
u
in Proposition 1 and serves the same purpose. Proposition 2
imposes less restrictive conditions for the equivalence to be satisfied,
in that it does not require any specific value of the risk-aversion
parameter P^. Thus, the model of Kyle (1985) can be viewed as the
limiting case of a larger game where the noise traders are fully
rational agents. This continuity property is important because it
ensures that there is no sudden "jump" in the equilibrium outcome in
moving from the larger game to its limiting solution.
III. A Model of Uninformed Trading
Both the models discussed in Section II emphasize uninformed
traders rather than uninformed trading. In other words, a distinct
group of traders are postulated who engage exclusively in trading
activities unrelated to information. An alternative approach, found in
Glosten (1989) (and following the earlier work of Glosten and Milgrom
(1985)), considers an individual trader who sometimes engages in
information-related and sometimes in risk-sharing trading activities.
The market in Glosten (1989) follows the microstructure of the
market in Glosten and Milgrom (1985). In this market, the market maker
posts a pricing schedule p(y_) which specifies the price that a trader
14
will obtain corresponding to any quantity y he demands. To facilitate
the comparison with Kyle (1985), I will substitute the batch market
mechanism for this posted-price mechanism while keeping all the other
features of the original model intact. Further, I will only focus on
the model with competitive market makers., Equivalence will again be as
described in Definition I. 9
It will be shown that there are no set of conditions such that
these two models are equivalent in the sense of Definition 1. While
either market depth or the expected total trading volume (but not both)
can have the same equilibrium values in the two models, the expected
price level is always strictly lower in the Glosten (1989) model.
There is a single risk-averse investor with private information s
about the value of the single risky asset v, where s = v + e and e is
uncorrelated with v. The investor is also endowed with w shares of the
risky asset. v, e and w are normally distributed with zero mean and
variances Zy , 2e and Sy . The investor has negative exponential utility
with risk-aversion parameter R > 0.
The investor submits his market order y to a single risk-neutral
and competitive market maker who sets a price p at which the order will
be executed. In the usual way, p E(v|y ). The market maker is
unaware when the investor's trades are information-based and when they
are not. He conjectures that y = B^ + B2w. This leads to a linear
price schedule p = rgyg* Let fc be as defined in Section 1, i.e.,
t = Ey/(SV+Ee ). Then Lemma 5 describes the equilibrium of this model.
15
Lemma 5: Suppose < t < 1. Define O = R (l-t) 2S
v
ZH . If O > t, then
there is a unique equilibrium to the trading model in which the investor
trades y = B^s + B2w and the price is p = r v where:
B1 = *&—. B3 - -V^ , and rg = fc^ (4)
Remember that t is a measure of the unconditional precision of the
information signal s. The equilibrium of Lemma 5 says that t also
measures the weight that the investor puts on each aspect of his trading
activities * The more precise is his information, the larger the weight
placed on his information-related trading activities. In the extreme,
when t = 1, the investor optimally ignores his endowment of w (i.e.,
B
2
= ) and acts as a pure informed trader. Of course, with no noise
trading, this cannot be an equilibrium. Similarly, when t = 0, the
investor is exclusively concerned with risk-sharing, B
1
= and again
equilibrium does not exist.
As in Spiegel and Subrahmanyam ( 1992 ) , the product of risk-
aversion and noise (named G here) must be sufficiently large for
equilibrium to exist and further, the equilibrium hedge factor B
2
< 0.
Unlike Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992), the magnitude of B2 < 1.
Uninformed traders are never perfect hedgers nor do they ever
"overhedge. " The equilibrium market depth is positively related to
risk-aversion R and negatively related to the information precision t.
Next, consider the relationship between this model and that of
Kyle (1985). Without loss of generality, the comparison made will be
16
with the solution of the Kyle model when the number of informed traders
m = 1. Proposition 3 shows that either r or the expected total trading
volume can separately have the same equilibrium values in the two
models. But if the value of one of these variables is equalized, the
equilibrium value of the other variable is strictly lower in Glosten by
a common factor of proportionality F < 1. Further, the expected price
level is also strictly lower in Glosten (1989) by the same factor of
proportionality F.
Proposition 3? Define F = -^H- < 1 and k = -=^ . (1) If ,/E - G
~t
. then
y/O^t **-. 2y/tQ
r
g
= r
n
and E(|y
g |) = FE<|yJ) < E<|yJ). (2) If & = *'* * thenQ-t
B(|y
g |) = E(|yn |) and Tg = FTn < r„. (3) E(|pg |) = FE(|pJ) < B(|pJ).
Proposition 3 essentially says that, to sustain the same level of
trading as in the Kyle (1985) market, market depth must be higher in the
Glosten (1989) model. Or to sustain the same depth of market, the level
of trading needs to be lower. The reason for this is that the investor
is risk-averse in Glosten (1989) and so B
1
, which measures the intensity
with which information is exploited, is inversely proportional to the
sum of r plus a risk premium (see Lemma 5). Whereas the informed
trader is risk-neutral in the other two models, so that the equilibrium
trading intensity is proportional to market depth only. Clearly, if the
same trading volume is to be sustained in all the models and R > 0, the
market depth has to be higher in the Glosten (1989) version. Hence, the
expected price level (which is a product of r and the expected total
trading volume) must be lower as well.
17
Notice that F < 1 follows from the existence condition G > t in
Lemma 5. Therefore, Proposition 3 directly implies that equivalence in
the sense of Definition 1 is not possible between the models of Kyle
(1985) and Glosten (1989) because this requires the risk-aversion
parameter R to be too low for equilibrium to exist.
Corollary 2: The models of Kyle (1985) and the version of Glosten
(1989) defined in this section can never be equivalent in the sense of
Definition 1 .
From Proposition 3, the metric 1 - F can be interpreted as a
measure of how much the equilibrium values of the variables differ
between the two models. For example, F = 1 implies full equivalence.
The next result shows that there exists B(k), which is a function of
k only, such that (1-F) = B(k). B(k) belongs to the open interval (0,1)
and is strictly increasing in k (which, it may be remembered, scales the
noise level in the two models). Thus, the between-model differences in
the equilibrium values cannot be arbitrarily far apart and, by choosing
lower values of k, the differences can be made smaller. For example,
from the expression for B(k) given in equations (A20) and (A24) in the
Appendix, B(l) = 0.46 while B(8) = 0.75.
Proposition 4: There exists a function B(k) , where < B(k) < 1, such
that (1-F) - B(k) . B(k) is strictly increasing in k and is derived in
equations (A20) and (A24) of the Appendix.
The condition that ensures the equality of market depths in part 1
of Proposition 3 appears to be very different from the restriction on R^
18
specified in Proposition 1. However, if the value of R implied by
Proposition 3 is solved for, the following expression is obtained (this
expression is derived in equations (A22) and (A23) of the Appendix):
Rg - -=±=-^-(>fc + tfTl) -Rg*. (5)
For easy reference, I restate (after fixing the number of informed
traders m = 1) the analogous condition which ensures the equality of the
market depths between the models of Kyle (1985) and Spiegel and
Subrahmanyam (1992) from Proposition 1:
Rh = —1— 1^1 =Rh\ (6)
In fact, the similarity of (5) to (6) is quite striking. In both
cases, the risk-aversion parameter is inversely proportional to the
variances of the asset value and the hedger's endowment and directly
proportional to k. It is possible to specify values of the information
* *
precision t and k such that R = R . Under these conditions, market
9 h
depth is equalized across all three models.
Corollary 3 s R = R if k = T2/ (16-8T) where T = t/(l-t).
9 h
Numerical calculations show that for k > 1, only four values of t
satisfy Corollary 3. These are shown in Table 1. One example is
k = 3.02 and t = 0.65. Higher values of t must be supported by higher
values of k.
19
In Section I, certain important properties of the equilibrium
solution in the Kyle (1985) model had been identified in Lemma 2. The
equivalence results in Section II simultaneously ensured that these
properties were satisfied in the model of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam
(1992) as well. Since full equivalence has been ruled out in this case,
it is clear that some or all of these properties will not hold here.
Corollary 4 states that price informativeness is always lower in the
model of Glosten (1989) but that, if the market depths are equal, then
the expected utility of the investor equals in magnitude the
unconditional expected profits of Kyle's monopolist insider. PI
denotes the informativeness of prices and V the certainty-equivalent
profits of the investor in the Glosten (1989) model.
Corollary 4s (1) PI = F2PI
n
< PI
n
. (2) Suppose r = rR . If k = 1/3,
then I
n
= |E(V
g)|.
Part (1) of the corollary follows directly from Proposition 3 if
we note that price informativeness Pli = I^Sy for i = g, n where Sy is
the variance of the total trading volume. Part (2) of the corollary
says that equalization of the market depths is sufficient to guarantee
equalization of the expected profits of the monopolist insider in Kyle
(1985) and the expected utility of the single investor in Glosten (1989)
if the respective noise terms are scaled appropriately (i.e., by
choosing an appropriate value of k) . Notice that, by construction, the
expected profits of the single investor is zero in Glosten (1989), so
E(V ) measures the expected variance of the investor's profits. The
20
magnitude of this term obviously depends on R
,
just as the equalization
of the market depths depend on a specific value of R .
By combining the results of Corollaries 3 and 4, it becomes
possible to specify conditions which simultaneously ensure that, first,
market depth is equalized across all three models and, second, the
expected utility of Glosten's investor is equal to the expected profits
of an individual informed trader in the other two models (when m = 1).
From Table 1, this condition is satisfied for the following parameter
configuration: k = 1/3, t = 4/7.
Corollary 5: Suppose r = r
n
and let T be as defined in Corollary 3.
If T2/(16-8T) = 1/3, then (1) rh = Tg = r„ and (2) I„ = I n = |E(Vg)|.
IV. Conclusion
This paper has examined the robustness of the Kyle ( 1985 ) model
with respect to the noise trader assumption. Two alternative
representations have been considered where the uninformed traders
behaved as rational agents but the batch market mechanism for price
determination was left intact. The first alternative model chosen was
that of Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992). Here, the uninformed traders
are viewed as risk-averse investors who trade to hedge their endowment
of risky shares. It was shown that when the uninformed traders hedge
all of their endowments ("perfect hedging") then this model and that of
Kyle (1985) are equivalent in the following sense: the equilibrium
values of market depth, the expected total trading volume and the
expected price level are the same in both models.
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Equivalence was proved both for two separate cases. First, when
the number of hedgers is finite and, second, for a limit economy where
the number of hedgers increased to infinity in such a way that the total
amount of noise in the market remained constant. In the finite case,
the uninformed traders' risk-aversion parameter has to equal a specific
value which is determined by the variances of the asset value and the
hedgers' endowments, the information precision and the number of hedgers
and informed traders. In the limit economy, equivalence holds for any
value of risk-aversion.
In the model of Glosten (1989), there is a sinqle risk-averse
investor with both endowments of information and shares of the risky
asset. The interpretation is that the investor's trades are motivated
both by risk-sharing possibilities as well as information. A version of
this model is considered where the posted-price mechanism in the
original model is replaced by a batch market mechanism. Unlike the
other two models, where a risk-neutral informed trader's equilibrium
trades are proportional to the market depth 1/r, the equilibrium trades
of Glosten 's risk-averse investor is proportional to the sum of r plus a
risk-premium. This fact, in turn, implies that the equilibrium value of
the expected price level in Glosten (1989) is strictly lower than its
corresponding value in Kyle ( 1985 ) . Thus these two models can never be
equivalent in the sense defined above.
However, any differences in the equilibrium values of the
variables is bounded from above. Further, partial equivalence is still
possible because there are conditions which separately equate the values
of market depth and the expected total trading volume between the models
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of Kyle (1985) and Glosten (1989). In fact, an additional restriction
ensures the equality of market depth across all three models. Also,
when the market depths are equal, the expected utility of Glosten 's
investor is also equal (in magnitude) with the unconditional expected
profits of an individual informed trader in the other two models.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1
m
Let E( v| s ,..., sm ) = as, where s = T^s 1 . Applying Bayes' rule,
1
a = — 2 = ± t where Q 1 + t(m-l).
IT
+
IT
Each informed trader 'i' chooses x 1 to maximize E(tt |s') f where:
*i - (v- rnx* -rTxMxv (Al)
Conjecture that each informed trader's trading rule is x' = A
n
si
° T^e
first-order condition for x' obtained by differentiating E(rr |s') gives
the optimal A
n
. T
n
is then obtained by using the optimal A and the
rule r
n
= cov(v,y
n
)/var(y
n
) .
Proof of Lemma 2
PIn = (Fn )
2Sy = -^4 * (rn) 2 s u
" (1+Q) 2 (A2)
= mtZv/(l+Q) .
C ./iS-Ty \ £2.<-n | Q i nyn j r (1+(0)
ts
-
t9 \ ts
i+Q/ rn (i+Q)
(AJ)
2 a 2t"s
rnod+o)
In - E(Cn J =
rnQ(i+o (A4)
l+Q
^L_
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Proof of Lemma 3
itl = v(u :i +w^) - rhu j /u j + D V w m +xh \ (A5)
where x
h is the trading volume of the informed traders. Because each w J
is independent of v, r
h
x
h
= T
n
x
n
. So:
Edc^jwJ) = -rh (uV (A6)
Var(uilwi) = E„(wJ) 2 + (u*) 2 Ej 1 mt (2+Q)
(1+Q) 2 (A7)
(rhD) 2 (k-l)E„] + 2Evu^-wJ
(
^~^
Differentiating V with respect to u J and then equating D with the
h
coefficient of w J in the resulting first-order condition yields:
RhD 3 (rh ) 2 (k-l)ZM D 2rh + RhZJ 1 - mt(Q
*2
?
}
v
l (Q+l) 2 (A8)
R,.z„ii-42- «lhuv Q+l
It follows from (A8) that since r
h
> to satisfy the second-order
condition for the informed traders, D < in equilibrium. Solving
for r
h
:
(A9)
yk2jw
Substituting for r
h
D in (A8) and solving for D:
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m
2,/mtLJ fggg - RhSv (2-t)
Rh2v (2-t)
^"v 1
k(Q+l)
(A10)
Since D < 0, equilibrium exists if:
2L( 2 -t) > ^^kh**v (All)
The denominator of D in (A10) is always positive, so (All) is
sufficient. To show this, rewrite the denominator ass
Denom = RhSv 1 •
RkE,
mt(Q+2) (k-l)mt
(Q+l) 2 J k(Q+l) 2
2=2- [ (l-c) (4+mt) *t 2 ] * (k
°1)mt
(Q+l) 2 k(Q+l) 2
>
In the second step, the definition Q - 1 + t(m-l) has been used.
Proof of Lemma 4
PI
h
PI
n
follows from the result PI^ = (r,) 2 Ey for i=h,n.
*»-*("--&)?£ts
l+Q
- I,
a:
=
(ts) 2
. c
r^
h
rhod*o) 2 n rh
-
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Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose Th rn . Then Ch = Cn from Lemma 4 and
**
=
r (1%)
=
r U+Q)
= Xh
'
Let S
*i
be the variance of x i* Writing std
to denote the standard deviation:
e(|Jb|) - 3td(yJ _ y^
+ a«. (Ai2)
v/2~Jt J2n
.
std(yh ) . ^D zkSv >S Xh (A13)
v^Slr \/2^
Since S^ = E Xh when I*h = rn , E(|yn |) = E(|yJ) implies that 2U = kD22y .
Therefore E(|u|) = E(|uh j) by the definition of expected uninformed
trading used in this paper (see footnote 8 for a discussion). Further,
I
n
I h
from Lemma 4.
Proof of Proposition 1
From Lemma 3
, |
D
|
= 1 when R^ is as given in the statement of the
proposition. If, in addition, Ey = k2y then E(|u|) = E(|uh |) from the
proof of Corollary 1. Also, from Lemma 4, rh = Tn and so E(jyn |) =
E(|yh |). It follows that E<|pJ) . liS^fikl . Lf^fiSi . i(W ) .
v2jt ^2n
Proof of Proposition 2
As k -» oo, D -» -1.
As k -» oo and k2
H
-» E
u
, Fh -» rn .
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Proof of Lemma 5
Let 7r
h be the profits of the investor. Then:
Kh = v(w + yg ) -rg (yg ) 2 .
Vh = ts(w + yg ) -Tg (yg )
2
- (0.5)Rg (w*yg ) 2 (l-t)E v . (A14)
In obtaining (A14), I have used the facts that E(v|s) = ts and
Var(v|s) = (l-t)2
v
.
Differentiating (A14) with respect to y gives:
t9 -Rgw(l-t)Sv
y
* 2rg *Rg d-t)Sv
and
R,t(l-t)Sv
•g
(Rq )
2 (l-t;) 2Ev2w -t
(A16)
Substituting r back into (A15) and writing G = (R ) 2 (l-t) 22vEH gives
equation (4). Obviously, G > t is necessary for r > 0.
Proofs of Corollary 2 and Proposition 3
When m = 1, Tn = * ^
v
. Therefore, r
g
= r
n
requires:
^ =
_u
=
G-t (A17)
2„ 2 v/t5"
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Using the results of Lemma 5:
G-t
G + t
and so:
std(y
g )
=
N
G-t (A18)
For m = 1, std(yn ) = ^/2EU . Therefore, E(|y |) = E(|yn |) requires that:
& = G-t
y^Gv^t
(A19)
When r = r
n
, std(yg ) = 2^--^- = std(vn ) -^- . using/G^t yc^t
= r„
y/2t
, wherefirst equality. When std(y„) = std(y_), Ta =9 n 3 y/2J^ v^t a VG^t
(A19) has been used to get the first equality. Finally, E(|p |) =
rnV/2rc" = £^- and E(
V2T
/if
occurs if F = v = 1. However, from Lemma 5, G > t for equilibrium
s/G^t
to exist. Thus, F < 1.
«" " rH^^ = ^1' C°-"P«in9- E(|pn |) =
E(|p I). Clearly, equality of all these variables simultaneously
Proof of Proposition 4
I must find a function B(k) = 1-F with < B(k) < 1 and Bk (k) > 0,
where B
k
is the derivative of B(k) with respect to k.
Write 1-F2 = B' (k) and note that:
B'(k)B(k) - - *-£* =
1 +F l +N/l-B'(k)
(A20)
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By definition, 1-F* = -^—- . Therefore, the function B'(k) must satisfy:
G
=
1+B'(k) (A2 i)
t l-B'(k)
'
Now, consider (A17) which is the condition for T
n
= r . It can be
viewed as a quadratic expression in the variable s/G\ as follows?
G - 2v/tZ>/G - t = 0. (A22)
Solving for v/S (the positive root):
JG - JE (yTc + /THc) = s/t K < A23 >
where K = ^ ^T+Ic. From (A21) and (A23)
B'(k) = i^i. (A24)
K 2 + l
Notice that B' (k) is a function of k only. Further, < B' (k) < 1
and -± ' > 0„ Therefore, B
k
(k) > as well and (A20) and (A24)
together defines the required function B(k). B(l) = 0.46 and
B(8) = 0.75, approximately.
Proof of Corollary 3
R = R requires:
t(^e + yrnc) = 4yic. < A25)
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Solving for k from (A25) gives the required solution. Table 1 gives the
feasible range of k and t which satisfy (A25).
Proof of Corollary 4
2 _ v2, i2 _(1) PI
g
= [E(|p
g
|)]< = F*[E(|P
n
|)]' = PI n •
(2) E(vg ) = E(«h ) - -^Var(nh ) = -^Var(sh )
_
_
a
grgs;
2
(1+B 2 ) 2 + (Bi) 2 ^
1-t 2R„ (A26)
For m = 1, In
requires that:
/t £ 2
-i —
- from Lemma 2. So I, |E(VJ| = t 1
1-t 2R r
R = _/L i
y **v U
(A27)
From (A23), r = r
n
requires that:
9 i-t yirrs;
(A28)
If both (A27) and (A28) are to be satisfied simultaneously, k = -i-
H-AS. 11-39
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Footnotes
1A11 references to the Kyle (1985) model will pertain to the static
solution only and not to the continuous time model
.
2The actual total trading volumes and price levels are not
comparable since these depend on the actual volume of noise trading,
which is not a choice variable in Kyle (1985). Further, the
expectations are of the absolute values of these variables. See
footnote 8 for further details of their calculations.
In particular, the composition of the total trading volume between
informed and uninformed trading is difficult to discern and so it is not
required that the equilibrium values of these variables be equated as
well. In models where there exists a distinct group of uninformed
traders, this distinction is not important because equivalence between
any two models in the sense defined here will automatically imply that
the expected informed and uninformed trading volumes are also equal. In
models where the same investor can trade for both informational as well
as, say, for risk-sharing purposes the distinction Is important and the
expected informed and uninformed trading volumes need not be equal.
Market depth is not directly observable, but is easily inferred as
the ratio of the expected price level to the expected total trading
volume.
5The version of Glosten (1989) derived in this paper is different
from the original model in that I have replaced the posted-price
mechanism of price determination in the original with a batch market
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mechanism, keeping all the other assumptions intact. Also, only the
problem of competitive market makers is studied, while the analysis of a
monopolist specialist is ignored. From now on, a reference to Glosten
(1989) will mean a reference to the specific version of that model
derived in this paper.
6In a different context, Rochet and Vila (1992) have shown, for a
version of Kyle (1985), that there exists a unique equilibrium
independent of the distribution of uncertainty.
Of course, the actual informed trading volumes will be different
since market depth will be different, in general.
o
"These are actually the expectations of the absolute values of the
uninformed trading volumes. Let std(r) be the standard deviation of the
random variable r and |d| be the absolute value of D. Then expected
trading volume is std(u) /-fin in the noise trading model and
\/K|D|std(w) /y^Ji in the hedger model (see Admati and Pfleiderer (1988)
for a discussion on the appropriate definition for expected trading
volumes). One might expect that the expected trading volume in the
hedger model should be k|D|std(w) /v/2~S~ . However, since noise traders in
the Kyle (1985) model are a continuum, for purposes of comparing the two
models it is useful to think of the k hedgers as one big hedger with
trading variance kD2S and standard deviation of trading as given above.
Notice that substituting k by ylc simply involves a monotonic
transformation. The expected informed trading volumes and the expected
price levels are defined in a similar way.
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oSince informed and uninformed trading volumes are not separately
defined in Glosten (1989), the only relevant variables for comparison
purposes are the market depth, the expected total trading volume and the
expected price levels.
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Table 1; (t.k) pairs satisfying (A25) in the Appendix
t 4/7 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66 > 0.66
k 1/3 1.22 1.78 3.02 8.01 <
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